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I. INTRODUCTION
Any proposed uniform mediation statute must address multiple concerns.2
This Article focuses on only one target: the distinctive ways in which a
uniform statute can shape the nature and practice of mediation to ensure that
its use comports with our considered notions of fairness. 3
This analysis requires two primary features. First, there must be an
operative conception of fairness against which to assess whether mediation
policies and practices embedded in a uniform statute support or transgress it.
Second, the central statutory provisions governing the design and use of
mediation must be identified, and the manner in which they advance or
undermine fairness considerations must be explicated. From such an analysis,
1 Professor of Law and Director of Advanced Studies, University of Missouri-
Columbia School of Law. B.A., Kalamazoo College, 1967; J.D., New York
University, 1970; Ph.D., University of Rochester, 1975. Member of New York Bar. I
discussed various themes in this Article at colloquia presentations to the faculties at the
University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law and The Ohio State University College
of Law and at the October 1997 meeting of the Uniform Mediation Project Team and
received wonderfully valuable advice and insights from the comments of those in
attendance. The research assistance of Ms. Kelli Douglas, a student in the MU-School
of Law, has been invaluable in the preparation of this Article.
21 will not address in this Article such matters as the way in which a uniform
statute could impact considerations of efficiency, costs to parties or "access to justice"
concerns. This Article is part of a longer work in progress by the author addressing the
relationship between the fundamental principles of a democratic society and methods
and tactics by which people and groups define and resolve differences.
3 To state that I focus on "only one" target should not diminish the significance of
this topic. Fundamentally, we are examining the following consideration: If persons in
our community use mediation (routinely, systematically or exclusively), should we be
concerned that they might be participating in a process that is arbitrary, capricious or in
other ways inconsistent with our fundamental notions of due process such that we would
not want them, as a matter of public policy, to participate in it? In the vernacular, will
persons "get screwed or gypped" if they participate in mediation? Further, this Article
analyzes the concept of fairness in mediation. But such an analysis presumes that
fairness is an important value to be secured. That proposition-that a dispute settlement
system should give priority to embracing or promoting considerations of fairness over
such values as predictability of outcome, uniformity of outcomes or efficiency of
process-of course, must be justified, not simply asserted. That argument, though,
requires a different level of analysis and is not addressed here.
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one can then propose statutory language that most effectively secures fairness
concerns.
A suitably framed conception of fairness bears straightforward
consequences for how a proposed uniform mediation statute should address
three central statutory topics: (1) a purpose clause; (2) a theory of bargaining;
and (3) a conception of the mediation process. The result would, on grounds
of fairness, affirmatively delete certain types of statutory provisions or court
rules that have gained a foothold in selected state jurisdictions.
II. A CONCEPTION OF FAIRNESS4
One must crystallize a sufficiently rich conception of fairness in order to
assess how particular statutory features advance or undermine its principles.
Doing that, of course, is a daunting, complex task;5 its complexity, however,
cannot paralyze us from positing the parameters of such a conception so that
we can proceed to the remaining tasks. The parameters include three
elements: a jurisprudential framework, distributional substantive principles
and procedural protections.
A. Jurisprudential Framework
This article starts by embracing the following jurisprudential point: the
meaning of fairness is not exhausted by the concept of "legal justice." 6 If the
4 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-137 (1977). Dworkin
distinguishes a concept as compared to the particular "conceptions" that one may have.
What is set forth above is clearly a conception within Dworkin's framework of analysis.
5 Such an enterprise has commanded the talents and energies of many outstanding
individuals. Philosophers alone would include such 19th century intellectual giants as
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill; in our own century, the efforts of John Rawls,
Alan Gewirth and David Gauthier reflect the breadth and depth of conscientious efforts
to develop a comprehensive analysis of this fundamental concept.
6 That is, I take the following locution to be perfectly plausible: "You are legally
entitled to X but that result does not produce a fair outcome." An example would be the
following: You are legally entitled to recoup rent arrears from your tenant, but you are
extraordinarily rich and your tenant is a single parent of three young children without
adequate resources to provide subsistence food and clothing articles. In no meaningful
sense would you be harmed if the arrears were not paid. Hence, compelling her to pay
rent arrears, even if that meant that she would have to take the money from what is
already a mere subsistence food and clothing allowance and leave her children further
destitute, as well as possibly being evicted from the premises, might be a legally
defensible result but not a fair one.
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primary objective for using mediation was to ensure that litigants have their
legal claims heard and results established in a more expeditious, informal,
nonadversarial atmosphere than would otherwise be obtained by using a
traditional litigation process, all that one could say with confidence about
such a use of mediation is that the parties secured at least what they were
legally entitled to, whether that outcome was fair or not.7
This dimension of legal positivism bears the following implication for the
uniform mediation statute: If a primary goal of the uniform mediation statute
is to promote or secure fairness, then its stated objectives cannot be simply or
exclusively to ensure that participants in a mediation process achieve what
they might or would have secured in an adjudicatory legal proceeding. The
challenge is much more daunting.8
What, then, are the necessary components of a concept of fairness against
which to assess whether statutory provisions secure their vitality? There are
two required dimensions: a substantive aspect and a procedural element. Each
will be considered in turn. Although this Article shall indicate briefly in this
Part how a statutory provision or mediation practice can advance or
undermine these fairness considerations, it reserves for Part III the more
detailed analysis of how proposed statutory provisions affect these conceptual
principles.
B. Substantive Dimensions of Fairness
The uniform statute's conception of fairness must.embrace a principle
that constitutes the functional equivalent of the difference principle in Rawls'
scheme. 9 Stated at a very general level, we would criticize the mediation
process as being "unfair" if outcomes achieved through it left some parties
much worse off from their starting position than they would have been had
they participated in any other dispute resolution process. For example, in a
7 The practical impact of this feature, to be discussed in more detail below, is
straightforward: A mediator who adopts what has been referred to as an evaluative
orientation may be criticized on the ground that his orientation frustrates rather than
advances fair settlement terms.
8 To some, though, that "daunting task" is also the great promise of mediation
suitably conceived and executed. See ROBERT A. BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE
PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CoNFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND
RECOGNMON (1994); Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, "Evaluative" Mediation
Is An Oxymoron, 14 ALuTRNATVS TO HIGH COST LmG. 31, 31 (1996) (responding to
Riskin grid article).
9 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTIcE 75-83 (1971).
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mediation focusing on a marital dissolution, if the husband were deliriously
happy with the substantive settlement terms he negotiated because they
required minimal financial and parenting obligations while the wife was
simply very unhappy with the outcome, we would criticize the outcome on
the grounds that the mediation process had allowed or promoted an unfair
outcome to be obtained, 10 even if according to a utilitarian calculus it was
demonstrated that the overall balance resulting from the combination of the
husband's being deliriously happy and the wife's being very unhappy
promoted an increased gain in the couple's utility function. In this important
sense, the idea that a concept of fairness must include a substantive
distributional dimension that trumps utility considerations appears persuasive
and central. 11
C. Procedural Dimensions of Fairness
The second, related dimension of a conception of fairness focuses on
procedure. Broadly speaking, principles of fairness must govern the manner
in which one conducts mediated conversations. These principles need not
replicate the due process procedural rules ingredient to a trial; however, they
must shape mediated conversations with sufficient focus and precision so that
one party does not have his or her sense of integrity, or self, systematically
undermined simply by virtue of the way in which the mediator interacted
with the parties or facilitated interaction among them. Examples of
elementary procedural requirements abound. If it were thought that a
mediator were justified in permitting one party's advocate to insult or
castigate his counterpart's client, thereby resulting in the collapse of that
party's self-esteem, we would criticize the mediation process for either
permitting (or affirmatively promoting) the violation of a party's right to be
10 The assumption, well grounded in the literature, is that mediation is a form of
assisted negotiations. Hence, the outcome described here is more accurately portrayed
as a negotiated outcome secured in the context of a mediator conducting a mediation
conference.
11 There are obvious complications with positing this difference principle. A
primary concern is how one, in the real world, establishes the starting position against
which to assess whether the produced outcome is better or worse. But its function is
what provides such a powerful foundation for criticizing the types of outcomes
identified in the example. This aspect of the principle is central to constraining the
adverse impact of discriminatory attitudes based on race, religion, gender, age and other
immutable characteristics from being given free reign in mediation or other dispute
resolution processes that we hope would command the allegiance of a community.
912
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treated with dignity and respect.12 The basis of our criticism would not be the
obvious pragmatic, psychological observations that allowing or promoting
such insulting or abusive behavior predictably polarizes parties, freezes them
into non-negotiable postures and quickly forecloses collaborative discussions
and the possibility of generating acceptable settlement arrangements. Rather,
our criticism would be predicated on the more fundamental concern
regarding fairness principles; allowing such behavior violates one party's
right to be treated as an equal. 13
Statutory provisions and practitioner rhetoric sometime suggest that these
procedural dimensions are not important. Mediation is frequently
characterized in statutes as an informal process.14 Rhetoric 15 frequently
12See RONALD DwoPr N, "REVERSE DIsCRIMINATION," TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 223-239 (1977).
13 See id. at 227. While this principle finds its conceptual home in a theory of
equality rather than one of fairness, presumptively a process that generated agreements
because one person with a diminished (fundamental) sense of self-esteem "caved in,"
would not be viewed as a "fair" process.
14 See CAL. Civ. CODE § 850(c) (West Supp. 1998) ("Mediation means an
informal process in which the disputing parties select a neutral third party to assist them
in reaching a negotiated settlement in which the neutral third party has no power to
impose a solution on the parties, but rather has the power only to assist the parties in
shaping solutions to meet their interests and objectives."); CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 56500.3(a) (West Supp. 1998): ("It is also the intent of the Legislature that
these voluntary prehearing request mediation conferences be an informal process
conducted in a nonadversarial atmosphere to resolve issues relating to the identification,
assessment, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free, appropriate
public education to the child, to the satisfaction of both parties."); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 44.1011(2) (West 1994) ("'Mediation' means a process whereby a neutral third
person called a mediator acts to encourage and facilitate the resolution of a dispute
between two or more parties. It is an informal and nonadversarial process with the
objective of helping the disputing parties reach a mutually acceptable and voluntary
agreement."); 710 ILL. COMp. STAT. 20/1 (West 1992) ("The General Assembly finds
that the resolution of certain disputes can be costly and time-consuming in the context of
a formal judicial proceeding; and that mediation of disputes has a great potential for
efficiently reducing the volume of matters which burden the court system in this State;
and that unresolved disputes which individually may be of small social or economic
magnitude are collectively of enormous social and economic consequence; and that
many seemingly minor conflicts between individuals may escalate into major social
problems unless resolved early in an atmosphere in which the disputants can discuss
their differences through an informal yet structured process .... "); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 330.1772(f) (1996) ("'Mediation' means a private, informal dispute resolution
process in which an impartial, neutral individual, in a confidential setting, assists parties
in reaching their own settlement of issues in a dispute and has no authoritative
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interprets a dimension of informality to be that traditional rules of evidence
governing document introduction or witness testimony do not apply in
mediation or that the privacy of the conversation licenses people to say
whatever they want to say if the party deems it relevant to the development of
possible settlement terms. But standard mediator practice reveals a more
consistent, formal practice regulating participant interaction than the image of
informality suggests, and such practices are justified by considerations of
fairness. 16
Mediators, for instance, routinely begin their service by establishing a
sound, conventional framework for handling pre-meeting conversations with
parties or their representatives or for structuring the exchange of pre-
mediation briefs or other information; these procedures are designed to be
balanced so that no one party has an initial advantage in the conversation.
Mediators start mediation conferences by explaining the mediation process
and the mediator's role, thereby establishing appropriate party expectations
regarding the decisionmaking environment and their respective roles in it.
They set forth guidelines by which the conversation will be conducted,
decisionmaldng power."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.l(b)(2) (1995) ("'Mediation'
means an informal process conducted by a mediator with the objective of helping parties
voluntarily settle their dispute."); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1805 (D) (1993) ("Each
mediation session shall be informal."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-17-320(14) (Law Co-op.
1996) ("Mediation means an alternative dispute resolution process whereby a mediator
who is an impartial third party acts to encourage and facilitate the resolution of a dispute
without prescribing what it should be. The process is informal and nonadversarial with
the objective of helping the disputing parties reach a mutually acceptable agreement.").
15 See LEONARD L. RIsIUN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND
LAWYERS 4 (1987); ABCs of ADR: A Dispute Resolution Glossary, 10 ALTERNATIVES
TO HIGH COST LITIG. 115-118 (1992); Gerald S. Clay & James K. Hoenig, The
Complete Guide to Creative Mediation, DisP. REsOL. J., Spring 1997, at 8, 8-9
("While virtually every other dispute resolution process cedes all or part of the power to
determine outcome to a third party, mediation is an informal, voluntary, loosely
structured process in which the mediator facilitates communication, encourages
exchange of information and ideas, tests the reality of parties' perceptions and ideas,
advises, suggests, translates what is said to detoxify the emotional climate, and at times
recommends and persuades, all in the service of assisting the parties to reach their own
agreement."); Walter G. Gans, Saving Time and Money in Cross-Border Commercial
Disputes, DIsP. RESOL. J., Jan. 1997, at 50; Julie M. Tamminen, Using Alternative
Dispute Resolution to Handle Client Disputes, 11 ME. B.J. 213, 213 (1996)
("Mediation: An informal, voluntary process used frequently in ongoing relationship[s],
such as family, neighborhood or community.").
16 See generally JOSEPH B. STULBERG, TAKING CHARGE/MANAGING CONFUCT
(1987).
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including the speaking order, the manner in which parties and advocates are
expected to address one another, and the like. The compelling justification for
these guidelines is to ensure fair treatment among the participants,
irrespective of whether a settlement is reached.17
But the issues and concerns surrounding how to ensure procedural
fairness in mediation conferences quickly become more complex and subtle;
statutory provisions must be attuned to these nuances if fairness is to be
secured. One prominent instance relates to diversity. Being sensitive to how
differences in conversational styles between women and men18 or between
persons of different ethnic backgrounds 19 are permitted to play out in a
mediated conversation is an important indicator of fairness. If the mediator
(or mediation process) requires persons to talk in a certain way- for
example, by presenting legal arguments, by using only "proper" or
conventional language or by being allowed to talk only to the mediator-
arguably that imposed conversational lens might instantly straightjacket one
party and place it at an unfair disadvantage.
Given these very broad parameters regarding substantive and procedural
17 There may not be an established body of knowledge that provides doctrinal
answers to some procedural issues for mediators. For instance, there is no rule
analogous to the doctrine of "standing to sue" or a "ripeness" requirement that informs
decisions regarding who is a "party" to the mediation conference or when the mediation
is most appropriately conducted. That absence of doctrine, however, does not operate to
undermine the capacity of the mediation process to promote a more robust vision of
procedural fairness than might otherwise issue from such established doctrines. For
instance, a mediator and the parties might deem the participation of grandparents in a
marital dissolution mediation as critical to an informed dialogue, even if those persons
are not parties to the lawsuit.
18 See generally DEBORAH TANNEN, You JUsT DON'T UNDERSTAND: MEN AND
WOMEN IN CONVERSATION (1990).
19 See generally CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION FOR BILINGUAL EDUCATION,
RECLAIMING OUR VOICEs: BILINGUAL EDUCATION CRITICAL PEDAGOGY AND PRAXIS
(Jean Frederickson ed., 1996); ANrrA DE FRANz, COMING TO CULTURAL AND
LINGUISTIC AWAKENING: AN AFRICAN AND AFRICAN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL VISION
(1994); EDWARD T. HALL, THE SILENT LANGUAGE (1959); KARLA HOLLOWAY, CODES
OF CONDUCT: RACE, ETHICs, AND THE COLOR OF OUR CHARACTER (1995); PAUL
SIEGEL, OUTSIDERS LOOKING IN: A COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVE ON TIE
HILL/THoMAs HEARINGS (1996); THE LYNCHING OF LANGUAGE: GENDER, POLrrICS,
AND POWER IN THE HILL THOMAS HEARINGS (Saundra L. Ragan et al. eds., 1996);
ROBERT LEWIS WILIuAMs, EBoNiCS: THE TRUE LANGUAGE OF BLACK FoLKs (1975);
Rene Sanchez, Ebonics Debate Comes to Capitol Hill, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1997, at
A15; Elaine Woo & Mary Curtius, Oakland School District Recognizes Black English,
L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 20, 1996, at Al.
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fairness, how might a uniform statute advance or undermine their integrity?
II. STATUTORY ELEMENTS ADDRESSING CONSIDERATIONS OF FAIRNE S
This Article will address three elements surrounding the use of mediation
that any statute must explicitly or implicitly address. These are (1) a purposes
clause, (2) an operative conception of bargaining and (3) a governing vision
of the mediation process.
A. Purposes
A statement of purpose can guide human conduct, even if it cannot
anticipate every configuration or interaction that it is, in principle, designed
to shape, guide or regulate. 20 But a statute can identify multiple types of
purposes, some of which might be substantive outcomes while others are
procedural goals. Current mediation statutes addressed to multiple contexts
embrace each kind. The following provisions are illustrative; their
significance for fairness is considered thereafter.
1. Substantive Outcomes
a. Family
[Tihe purpose of the mediation proceeding is to reduce
acrimony... and to develop an agreement assuring the child's close and
continuing contact with both parents after the marriage is dissolved21
b. Victim Offender
[T]he Legislature hereby finds and declares:
(a) Over the last 10 years, criminal case filings, including misdemeanor
filings, have been increasing faster than any other type of filing in
California's courts. Between 1981 and 1991, nontraffic misdemeanor and
infraction filings in municipal and justice courts increased by 35 percent.
(b) [M]any of these cases are ill-suited to complete resolution through
20 See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
21 MINN. STAT. § 518.619 (1990) (custody or visitation; mediation services)
(emphasis added).
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the criminal justice system because they involve underlying disputes which
may result in continuing conflict and criminal conduct within the community
(c) By utilizing [mediation] processes, these program also provide an
opportunity for direct participation by the victims of the conduct, thereby
increasing victims' satisfaction with the criminal justice proces&22
c. Community Dispute Resolution
Foster the development of community-based programs that will assist
citizens in resolving disputes and developing skills in conflict resolution23
d. Employment Relations
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate
the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce
and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining .... 24
[A] sound and stable industrial peace and the advancement of the
general welfare, health, and safety of the Nation and of the best interests of
the employers and employees can most satisfactorily be secured by the
settlement of issues... through the processes of conference and collective
bargaining .... [The settlement of issues between employers and
employees through collective bargaining may be advanced by making
available full and adequate governmental facilities for.., mediation ... to
aid and encourage employers and the representatives of their
employees ... to make all reasonable efforts to settle their differences by
mutual agreement reached through conferences and collective
bargaining .... 25
22 CAL. PENAL CODE § 14150 (West 1992) (emphasis added).
23 OR. REV. STAT. § 36.105 (1996) (emphasis added).
24 National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982) (Findings and
Policies).
25 Labor Management Relations Act § 201, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982) (emphasis
added).
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2. Procedural Outcomes
a. Civil Court Mediation
It is estimated that the average cost to court for processing a civil case is
$3,943 for each judge day.... The judicial council shall deem [mediation]
successful if it results in estimated savings of at least $250,000 to the courts
and corresponding savings to the parties Alternative processes for reducing
the cost, time, and stress of dispute resolution, such as mediation, have been
effectively used in California and elsewhere. In appropriate cases mediation
provides parties with a simplified and economical procedure for obtaining
prompt and equitable resolution of their dispute and a greater opportunity to
participate directly in resolving these disputes. Mediation may also assist to
reduce the backlog of cases burdening the judicial system26
b. Consumer Affairs
[The Legislature hereby finds and declares all of the following: [t]he
resolution of many disputes can be unnecessarily costly, time-consuming,
and complex when achieved through formal court proceedings where the
parties are adversaries and are subjected to formalized procedures. To
achieve more effective and efficient dispute resolution in a complex
society, greater use of... mediation... should be encouraged. 27
c. Trademark
[T]he U.S. District Court for the Northern District of illinois recently
established a voluntary mediation program for cases arising from trademark
disputes in an effort to reduce litigation costs and resolve disputes faster. 8
d. Misdemeanors
Many victims of misdemeanor criminal conduct feel excluded from the
criminal justice process. Although they were the direct victims of the
offender's criminal conduct, the process does not currently provide them
with a direct role in holding the offender accountable for this conduct29
26 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1775 (West Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
27 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 465 (West 1990).
28 11inois Court Starts Mediation Program, DIsp. RESOL. J., Spring 1997, at 5, 5.
29 CAL. PENAL CODE § 14150 (West 1992) (emphasis added).
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3. Significance
The significance that these statements of statutory purpose carry for
considerations of fairness is readily apparent. They will be considered
seriatum.
a. Substantive Outcomes
At the substantive level, two competing approaches are illustrated. One
approach attempts to secure specific fights or outcomes for one or more of
the parties to the process; the alternative features a commitment to a process
of dispute resolution that bears implications for assessing both the starting
positions and permissible outcomes for the parties but does not stipulate or
require particular terms of resolution. Fairness principles are undermined by
the former provisions but secured by the latter.
The provisions noted above governing both the family and victim
offender mediation assert straightforwardly a substantive outcome that parties
must promote or with which they must comply. The goal of each statute is to
ensure that certain rights of particular parties are vindicated. Thus, a
mediated outcome in Minnesota that did not "assure the child's close and
continuing contact with both parents after the marriage is dissolved" 30 would
violate the public policy articulated in the statutory framework. Arguably,
though, a different arrangement from that required by the statute might
promote a more fair outcome.
For example, the parties and the affected individuals (e.g., children,
grandparents or extended family members) might stipulate the following: (1)
the children would have either no or only limited contact with one parent
following the divorce but they would spend time with closely regarded
grandparents or extended family members; and (2) financial resources would
be allocated to maximize and sustain this contact as well as provide for other
educational opportunities for the adults and children. Hypothetically, such an
arrangement might be preferred by the parties and the affected individuals
and be endorsed by impartial experts in family development and dynamics as
one that promotes the best interests of the children as well as each parent and
other affected adults. Hence, in every significant way, it constitutes an
arrangement that would place the parties in a substantially better position than
either their current situation provides or that required by the mandated
statutory purpose. Thus, complying with the stated statutory purpose would
30 MINN. STAT. § 518.619 (1990).
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have undermined fairness.
More sharply, though, one can also envision how the required mediated
outcome could force a change in the parties' current circumstances that
leaves one or more participants notably worse off. In that situation, the
mediation process would have been a partner in affirmatively facilitating legal
but unfair outcomes.
A similar result holds for each of the other statutory provisions in which
an explicit component of the purpose of the mediation process is to promote
or secure identifiable rights or outcomes. For example, any person
conducting a community mediation conference under Oregon's Community
Dispute Resolution Act31who helps generate a resolution that does not result
in tangibly improving the parties' capacity to resolve future disputes has
failed to do the work required by the statute. Further, arguably, the statute
prohibits the parties from agreeing to refrain from future contact with one
another, for such an arrangement does not improve their conflict resolution
skills so much as to structure for them an environment in which neither will
have to use their conflict resolution skills with one another.
Victim offender mediation promotes discussions between the victim and
offender over elements of restitution. As a precondition for participating in
Victim Offender Restitution Programs (VORP), a defendant typically must
acknowledge responsibility for the commission of a criminal act.
Conversations in mediation that are related to the interpersonal dynamics
that might have led to the proscribed criminal action are not encouraged. 32
Hypothetically, if the victim, in some significant way, provoked the
defendant to commit the assault and battery by having made a remark or
casting a glance that was racially offensive or gender insensitive, discussion
of that provocative incident will not arise because addressing matters that are
31 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
32 Hypothetical: A Caucasian female, walking down a busy downtown shopping
sidewalk, observes three African American youths walking on the sidewalk in the
opposite direction toward her. She immediately backs up against the wall of stores, and,
while nervously maintaining eye contact with the approaching youths, begins taking off
her bracelet and earrings and hastily stuffing them into her purse. The youths, according
to their account, are so offended by the perception that "black males will rob," that
they immediately surround her and take her purse. The woman screams, and a nearby
police officer arrests the one youth who is holding the handbag. It is a first offense for
the youth and the matter is referred to victim offender mediation. The literature suggests
that the only topic of conversation should be for the youth to apologize to the adult and
agree to perform appropriate restitution projects. The underlying concern of the youth
being stereotyped in racist terms goes unmentioned.
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likely to reduce victim satisfaction with the criminal justice system
undermines the prescribed statutory purpose. Fairness, of course, would
dictate different starting points.
This tension between statutory purposes and fairness principles changes
dramatically by adopting the approach to a purpose clause that is so
distinctive about the National Labor Relations Act.33 That approach identifies
a broad social goal to be promoted (eliminating the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce) but explicitly refrains
from identifying one particular substantive outcome or set of outcomes as
being necessary and sufficient conditions for eliminating those obstructions,
or even as some being preferable to others. Affirmatively, the statute
endorses a procedure-collective bargaining (and, later, its supportive
services)- as the preferred method for promoting its overall purpose. And it
rests its faith on the participants in that process and in the values which are
constitutive of it to generate outcomes that advance its commanding vision of
an employment relationship that serves the interests of the nation.
Of course, there must be some operative notion of collective bargaining
guiding the framer's use of the term, and there is. It is a vision of two
groups, vigorously representing sometimes competing but oftentimes
dovetailing interests, meeting to "hammer out" settlement terms. There is an
operative presumption of an employer's or union's right to be treated with
dignity and respect by their respective counterparts, a respect for the capacity
of each party to identify its respective concerns and priorities and a
confidence that the dialogue process will enable the parties to secure their
substantive interests in a manner compatible with the community's interest.
That vision of the elements of a dispute resolution system is breathtaking in
its confidence in the democratic process and spirit. It offers a robust vision of
the possibility of developing fair outcomes and targets particular ways for
ensuring threshold starting positions of dignity and strength.
b. Procedural Outcomes
Statutes that stipulate process goals can also adopt one of two approaches:
They can prescribe goals or benchmarks against which to evaluate
mediation's cash value, or they can set forth procedural guidelines by which
the mediation process is to be conducted.
33 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
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i. Efficiency Goals
Conflicts between claims of efficiency and fairness are easy to construct.
Mediation practitioners report subtle and not so subtle pressures to conduct
mediation conferences promptly, expeditiously and successfully (i.e., the
parties settle) in order to be perceived by various referring judicial personnel
as effective. California stipulates that using mediation for civil cases should
result in an overall savings of at least $250,000 to the parties and courts. 34
These efficiency goals will, or should, influence the manner in which the
mediation session is conducted. It could, hypothetically, lead a mediator to
restrict the number of participants in the mediation conference in order to
minimize the costs of conversation. Such an approach clearly can be seen to
shape and, arguably, distort the discussion process in a way that undermines
fairness considerations. Multi-party cases, for instance, involving alleged
violations of constitutional rights might be conducted in such a manner as to
prematurely restrict participation and needlessly restrict ranges of dialogue
and outcomes, 35 all in the name of "keeping focused." Efforts to present
information to a mediator in a concise, focused way (i.e., efficient) militates
in favor of having legal counsel, not the parties, control presentation and
exchange of information, arguments and proposals. The repeat player in
mediation who has seen many cases like the instant one and knows where it
will settle, if at all, drives the process to reward efficient administrative
processing and disposition of cases. But celebrating impatience when a lack
of imagination is the culprit puts fairness and efficiency in conflict.
ii. Values in Process Goals
The second, competing approach adopted in the process category
involves statutory provisions that secure fundamental features of a fair
process. These provisions value having those persons directly affected by the
incidents and their outcome participate in the process of resolving it. Again,
requiring this can operate at cross purposes with efficiency. Conducting a
conversation between a victim of crime and the perpetrator might consume a
considerable period of time compared with a prompt trial, or, perhaps
34 See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1775 (West Supp. 1993).
35 Lela P. Love & Cheryl B. McDonald, A Tale of Two Cities: Day Labor and
Conflict Resolution for Communities in Crises, DIsp. RESOL. J., Fall 1997, at 8-10.
Love and McDonald describe how Glen Cove, N.Y. and Agoura Hills, CA addressed
disputes of this nature.
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preferred, a plea bargain arrangement that disposes of the matter. In civil
cases, mandating the participation of those with authority to make settlement
decisions might require the attendance of the company's chief executive
officer, 36 thereby imposing a cost on the process that could make it
prohibitive or cumbersome. Mandating or encouraging plea-bargaining-type
processes or settlement discussions involving only party representatives
with a mediator might expedite.the disposition of the legal claims (or a
settlement that pivots around the respective assessment of the strengths and
weaknesses of the legal claims), but they are contrary to the legislative
prescription that engaged participation by parties to the controversy holds the
best hope for developing multiple options for the respective outcomes of all
parties, i.e., advancing fairness.
This discussion suggests that a statutory purpose clause, to secure
fairness, must target two components. It must firmly posit a fundamental
dispute resolution process (mediation and its predicate process, negotiation)
that itself comports with the substantive principles of fairness; and it must
establish procedural guidelines that focus not on efficiency standards as the
defining features of the process but rather on those elements of a
conversational exchange that secure and ensure dignity and respect. Such a
two-prong purpose clause will operate effectively in the real world-that is,
ensure that mediation is not a sham camouflage for systematically reinforcing
power disparities- only if the visions of the predicate process embraces
features consistent with the governing conception of fairness. It is to a
consideration of what assumptions statutes make about that predicate
process-bargaining-to which we now turn.
B. Theories of Bargaining
Bargaining literature suggests that there are two primary orientations for
negotiating: competitive and principled. The literature often characterizes this
contrast as adversarial versus problem-solving orientations. For discussion
purposes, the salient point to note is that writers and practitioners frequently
attach a normative judgment to the desirability of these orientations. The
presumption of competitive bargaining is that the process operates to
constrain the otherwise unfettered maximization of self-interest; its language
suggests that parties must compromise to reach acceptable, even if not
optimal, solutions. Those advocating the problem-solving orientation, by
contrast, insist that its approach engages the imagination of the parties in such
36 See G. Heileman Brewing v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989).
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a manner as to promote dialogue and brainstorming so that parties expand the
domain of settlement options. Rather than feeling compelled to accept a
"half-a-loaf' settlement, problem-solving proponents argue that their
approach enables persons to promote wiser outcomes in a more efficient
manner without damaging the relationship among the parties.37 On these
criteria, they argue, principled bargaining should be the preferred orientation.
Because mediation is predicated on the negotiation process, often being
referred to simply as "assisted negotiations," a uniform mediation statute
could endorse or embrace either orientation to bargaining; the orientation it
supports carries implications for mediator behavior and duties. Not
surprisingly, the adopted orientation has implications for fairness
considerations. It is easier to discern how statutes embrace a bargaining
theory-or try to twitch it-by examining briefly the type of situation that
would be, and should be, of concern to anyone drafting a mediation statute.
Bargaining is predicated on power relationships among participants. 38
Power is relevant to the party's capacity not only to propose or impose
settlement terms, but also, and more important, to establish what items are to
be bargained and in what sequence they will be discussed. To discuss a
power relationship immediately raises concerns about balance, equality and
protection. What is unnerving about the image of independent, autonomous
individuals bargaining about their outcome is our warranted skepticism that
autonomy might be an illusion. Historical examples abound. Minor children
who are starving and thereby agree to work a sixty-hour week at subsistence
wages do not meet the paradigmatic image of independent, autonomous
agents engaging in a discussion to strike a bargain over terms of their
employment relationship. Similarly, adults who operate in bargaining
situations at disadvantages of wealth, linguistic skill, information or visions of
the possibilities will always lose to their bargaining counterparts. 39 That is,
37 The most familiar account of these orientations to bargaining is set forth in the
immensely popular and influential book, Getting to Yes. See generally ROGm FIsHER &
WILtAM URY, GETTrING TO YES (1981). Its vocabulary has been incorporated into a
wide range of bargaining contexts. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
promotes "interest-based bargaining." For a typical critique and alternative perspective,
see DANIEL A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBANIUS, THE MANAGER As NEGOTIATOR (1986).
The seminal treatment of adversarial bargaining techniques and analytical framework
remains RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. McKERsE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF
LABOR NEGOTIATIONS (1965).
38 See generally SAMUEL B. BACHARACH & EDWARD J. LAWLER, POWER AND
POIrrCS IN ORGANIZATIONS (1980).
39 Cf. JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES (1983).
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their posture and skills expose them to the real possibility that via the
bargaining process, they will substantively be worse off after the bargain than
they were before discussion started. That is, the outcome would violate the
substantive fairness principle. Such persons do not need to be placed in a
bargaining room with their counterpart and advised to exercise their freedom;
rather, they need the support of advocates who marshal substantial political
and social capital to create by legislation those conditions that minimize
inequalities or afford a safety net of economic and social benefits. All that is
proper.
Bargaining does assume autonomy. Why promote it? An appropriate
analysis requires a substantial investigation of the principles of political
theory ingredient to a constitutional democracy. But a quick glimpse of its
value can be gleaned from the following observations: The pervasive power
of contract among persons or businesses is acclaimed not simply as an
efficient economic device but as a framework for moral interaction among
persons who have a right to be treated with equal dignity and respect. Those
supporting the process of collective bargaining in the United States extol it as
a vehicle that respects the capacity of individuals, through their group
spokesperson, to identify concerns of significance, to articulate their
relevance and to persuade others to respond or honor their need. And one
dimension of the collapse of the former Soviet Union was the motivating
passion of solidarity to assert that an individual should be able to participate
meaningfully in shaping the conditions, working and otherwise, that define
his existence.
So, there is an understandable clash or tension. Some persons40 view aspects
of the world as needing "corrective alignment" and pass laws to establish
various entitlements and protections to ensure that those rights are secured;
the expectation and hope of those persons is to make certain that persons
operating in the shadow of such legislatively or judicially created rights are
not at liberty to ignore those entitlement claims or undermine the
obligations that issue from such guidelines because the dispute resolution
processes they deploy enable them to do so. Others endorse using a dispute
resolution process-bargaining- in which parties, by their own choice, are
free to incorporate a variety of norms into their decisionmaking process and
retain the freedom to establish and resolve matters through their assessment
40 And clearly it could be that all persons at some time believe in the need for
collective "correction" or affirmative action to shape desirable social and civic
conditions. That is, it is not simply those characterized as "social reformers" who seek
to use the processes of legislation to promote particular ends; persons at all ends of the
political spectrum use the processes as they see it relevant to their needs.
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of how all interests,, both legal and non-legal, should issue in a schedule of
priorities. This tension is revealed in how statutory drafters and
commentators define the bargaining process or the mediator's role in it.
41
Those who view bargaining as principled reveal a statutory orientation that
presumes safety nets in the sense that there is confidence that nothing
untoward or unjust can be expected to happen.42 By contrast, those
advocating a competitive bargaining theory would embrace the definition of
bargaining set forth in the National Labor Relations Act:
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation
of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment... but such obligation
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making
of a concession.43
These competing bargaining orientations stereotypically possess the
following features: principled bargaining will be friendly (gentler), oriented
towards problem-solving (non-adversarial) and collaborative (informal);
that is, it will consist of a series of discussions in which dialogue occurs
among persons of good will who share information in an informal manner
with the goal of exploring how mutual or dovetailing interests can be
satisfied. Competitive bargaining, on the other hand, embraces a
conception of bargaining captured in the metaphor of the "level playing
field." As long as everyone is in the same stadium, on the same field and
playing according to the same rules, bargainers are at liberty to establish
their preferred outcomes. To continue the sports metaphor, if the "final
41 Those who view the process as competitive fear that power disparities might
cripple parties from securing legal entitlements, so they are motivated to include
complementary provisions to ensure legal justice. Examples of such statutory provisions
appear supra at note 21 and note 22.
42 See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100
YALE L.J. 1545, 1551 (1991) ("Mediation fails to fulfill its promise to be a gentler
alternative to the adversarial system.") (emphasis added); see also CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 56500.3 (West Supp. 1998) ("It is the intent of the Legislature that... these [special
education] voluntary prehearing request mediation conferences be an informal process
conducted in a nonadversarial atmosphere.") (emphasis added); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 44.1011 (2) (West 1995) ("Mediation is an informal and nonadversarial
process . . . .") (emphasis added).
43 National Labor Relations Act, § 158(d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)
(emphasis added).
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score" of the game is 81-0, then, in the eye of the competitive bargainer,
nothing perverse, untoward or unfair has occurred.
Before examining the implications of a particular bargaining perspective
on fairness considerations, one must analyze the consequences that a
particular bargaining theory carries for mediator conduct. The following
statutory excerpts illustrate the impact on mediator performance that follows
from a particular orientation toward bargaining.
C. Mediator's Duties to Facilitate Bargaining
Some statutory provisions regulating mediator conduct explicitly reject
the competitive bargaining approach. A California statute, for example,
provides:
Mediation of cases involving custody and visitation concerning children
shall be governed by uniform standards of practice adopted by the Judicial
Council. The standards of practice shall include, but not be limited to, all of
thefollowing... the conducting of negotiations in such a way as toequalize
power relationships between the parties."44
The statute prescribes that a mediator not remain impartial in his efforts
to conduct the conversation so as to establish a balance of power; the
analogous outcome of an 81-0 score would not be permitted under this
framework. Thus, if there is to be any negotiated agreement at all under the
California statute, the more powerful party will be required in some
important way not only to recognize the interests of their bargaining
counterpart but, quite tangibly, agree to arrangements that affirmatively move
toward satisfying them. It is easy to understand, though not endorse, why
some parties, namely, the more powerful ones, resist the notion of
participating in mediation.
Similarly, Florida provides that "[a] mediator shall assist the parties in
reaching an informed and voluntary settlement." 45 This places an affirmative
duty on the mediator to prohibit competitive tactics that utilize nondisclosure
of pertinent information to frame the party's decisionmaking perspective. A
contrary theme regarding which bargaining theory to incorporate into the
mediation framework is sounded elsewhere. Iowa and Minnesota are
illustrative:
44 CAL. FAM. CODE § 3162(b)(3) (West Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
45 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 10.060(a) (West 1997) (emphasis added).
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Iowa
1. The farm mediation service, with the assistance of knowledgeable
persons, shall provide a program to train mediators to assist in the mediation
of nuisance disputes.
2. At the initial mediation meeting and subsequent meetings, the
mediator shall:
a. Listen to all involved parties.
b. Attempt to mediate between all involved parties.
c. Encourage compromise and workable solutions.46
Minnesota
The effect of a mediated settlement agreement shall be determined under
principles of law applicable to contract. A mediated settlement agreement is
not binding unless it contains a provision stating that it is binding and a
provision stating substantially that the parties were advised in writing that (a)
the mediator has no duty to protect their interests or provide them with
information about their legal rightg (b) signing a mediated settlement
agreement may adversely affect their legal rights; and (c) they should consult
an attorney before signing a mediated settlement agreement if they are
uncertain of their rights.47
As these provisions reflect, the vocabulary of "compromise" is
ingredient to the competitive bargaining framework. The mediator's duty is to
persuade or encourage people to adjust their proposals and differences in
order to promote settlement, even if those compromises do not promote one's
more fundamental interests. Minnesota's provision is more explicit: the
mediator has no business trying to equalize power relationships or ensuring
that proposed settlement outcomes are compatible with, much less required
by, legal rights and obligations. Parties are free-autonomous- to strike
their own deals shaped by whatever combination of sources of rules and
principles they find persuasive, be they religious, moral, economic,
psychological or legal.
If one accepts the notion that there are two distinctive visions of
bargaining, it becomes evident that the decision to embrace one framework
allows for certain types of party and mediator behavior while proscribing
others. To engage in problem-solving bargaining is to reject the notion of
compromise. To presume that it is the mediator's duty to equalize the
46 IOWA CODE ANN. § 654B.5 (West 1995) (emphasis added).
47 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.35(1) (West 1988)(emphasis added).
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bargaining relationship is incompatible with the conception that bargaining
does not require either party (however powerful one might be) to agree to a
proposal or make a concession. To ensure that party's decision is informed
eliminates or minimizes whatever competitive advantage one party might
obtain by strategically withholding certain information during the bargaining
process.
Two related components of the bargaining process are frequently
regulated by statute and their impact must also be assessed against fairness
standards. These elements are the topics deemed eligible for bargaining, and
the timing or sequence in which eligible bargaining topics must be discussed
and resolved.
1. Scope of Issues
a. California Family Code
An agreement reached by the parties as a result of mediation shall be
limited as follows: (a) where mediation is required to settle a contested issue
of custody or visitation, the agreement shall be limited to the resolution of
issues relating to parenting plans, custody, visitation or a combination of
these issues.48
Where it appears from a party's application for an order under this
chapter or otherwise in the proceedings that the custody of, or visitation
with, a minor child is contested, the court shall set those issues for mediation
pursuant to Section 3170. The pendency of the mediation proceedings shall
not delay a hearing on any other matter for which a temporary order is
required, including child support, and a separate hearing, if required, shall
be scheduled respecting the custody and visitation issues following mediation
in accordance with Section 3170. However, the court may grant a
continuance for good cause shown. 9
b. National Labor Relations Act
Mo bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of
the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
48 CAL. FAm. CODE § 3178 (West 1994) (emphasis added).
49 CAL. FAM. CODE § 20019 (West 1994).
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and conditions of employment 50
c. Indiana Agricultural Debt Mediation
[Tihe Commissioner... must establish (a program [mediation
program] which has) reasonable procedures to encourage a financially
troubled farmer... and each creditor of the financially troubled farmer to
participate in efforts to restructure the farmer's loans.51
2. Sequence and Timing
a. Texas
It is the policy of this state to encourage ... the early settlement of
pending litigation through voluntary settlement procedures.52
b. New Jersey
The Legislature declares that the State's preference for the resolution
of existing and future disputes involving exclusionary zoning is the
mediation and review process set forth in this act and not litigation.53
c. California
In any proceeding where there is at issue the custody of or visitation
with a minor child, and where it appears on the face of the petition or
other application for an order or modification of an order for the custody
or visitation of a child or children that either or both such issues are
contested, as provided in Section 4600, 4600.1, or 4601, the matter shall
be set for mediation of the contested issues prior to or concurrent with the
setting of the matter for hearing. 54
How is a statutorily prescribed agenda and mandated bargaining sequence
50 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (emphasis added).
51 IND. CODE § 15-7-6-10 (emphasis added).
52 TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.002 (West 1997) (emphasis added).
53 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-316 (West 1986). Parties must go through
mediation/review process for six months before entitled to litigation. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:27D-303 (West 1986) (emphasis added).
54 CAL. FAM. CODE § 4607(a) (West 1994).
[Vol. 13:3 1998]
FAIRNESS AND MEDIATION
congruent with a bargaining orientation and, by implication, party bargaining
tactics and mediator behavior? The answer appears to be straightforward:
The more limited the range of bargaining topics and the more rigid the
required bargaining sequence, the more likely the parties will adopt a
competitive-bargaining orientation. In the employment sector, if management
and union need only discuss "mandatory subjects of bargaining," 55 then
opportunities for. (creative) problem-solving tied to interest-based
considerations are severely constrained. In the family area, requiring parties
to discuss only parenting arrangements before any other economic matters
can be bargained limits the range of possible and imaginative arrangements.
To insist that bargaining (and mediation) must occur before any other process
can commence constrains the parties' ability to utilize multiple dispute
resolution fora as a bargaining strategy.
How, then, do these statutory provisions affect the relationship between
the bargaining process and fair procedures and outcomes. The provisions
regulating party negotiation in custody and visitation controversies sharply
reflect the combined impact of structuring the sequences of process use with a
restricted domain of application. Succinctly, many statutes require that in a
contested divorce proceeding, parties must first try mediation of parenting
issues only (custody and visitation) before they are permitted (in a
nonmediated session) to consider economic issues. These statutes attempt to
preclude a presumptively wicked, powerful spouse from using unfair
bargaining tactics, predicated on power disparities, to achieve unfair
outcomes.56 Without denigrating the source of that concern, there can be no
question but that the statutory framework imposes a rigidity on the bargaining
process that might otherwise permit independent bargainers to create
outcomes that better satisfy the interests of all.
To make these observations regarding mandatory bargaining agenda and
55 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958)
(confirming the distinction between mandatory, permissive and illegal subjects of
bargaining in private sector labor-management relations).
56 The situation which one seeks to avoid is presumptively the following: prohibit
an individual (almost always, the alleged perpetrator is the financially secure, selfish
husband) from linking economic considerations regarding spousal support and property
distribution from concerns about parenting. The oft-feared demand (or, more
accurately, "bargaining ploy" or ruse) of the husband making an initial demand for
exclusive custody of the children with no opportunity for visitation in exchange for
modest financial support must then be met with the (female) spouse's response (or, plea)
for complete custody and "minimal financial" support; presumptively, these "games"
are prohibited by these statutory rules for sequencing.
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sequencing is not to deny that important policy reasons can be marshalled to
support such statutory requirements. For example, to limit bargaining to
prescribed topics satisfies components of due process: it focuses discussion,
reduces the potential surprise one party might otherwise experience at a
mediation conference and ensures that one's ability to surface and share
relevant information on the stated topics is protected. Further, mandating that
some topics cannot be ignored by one or more parties supports at least one
party's ability to get the matter on the table; having such a requirement
renders irrelevant the fact that one party might not want to entertain or
discuss a proposal on that matter.
But there are important drawbacks to bargaining behavior and strategy
that attend the policy decision to restrict these features of bargaining
behavior. The converse of identifying matters that must be discussed is that
those matters not identified as required topics are deemed "discretionary. "57
That is, if matters other than those licensed by the statute are raised, the
receiving party is legally entitled to refuse to consider or discuss them. But
the conventional wisdom about bargaining and mediation is that part of its
strength lies just in its potential for identifying sharply a range of concerns
that are either only tangentially addressed by the stated legal causes of action
or are ignored altogether; 58 to authorize one party to refuse to discuss some
topics (as contrasted with being persuaded to discuss them) undermines the
potential for advancing pareto optimal outcomes, or outcomes that violate the
difference principle of fairness. Recently discussed cases involving litigation
over constitutional issues sharply reveal how parties' lawyers' attempts to
limit the domain of topics to targeted issues (i.e., legal causes of action)
57 This precise terminology is operative in the labor-management arena, both
private and public sectors, in which the concepts of "mandatory" and "non-mandatory"
(or "discretionary") topics of bargaining focus the discussions. A non-mandatory
bargaining topic-for example, tuition reimbursement for employees taking non-job-
related courses at a local high school, community college or four-year institution-is
one for which a union might make a proposal but the employer is free either to discuss
it or to refuse to talk about it all; if the latter position obtains, then the union
representative is foreclosed from discussing it further. Obviously, serious debate and
controversy erupt over defining what is a "wage, hour or other term and condition of
employment" (mandatory subjects of bargaining) and what are discretionary issues.
Whether the decision to close a plant is a mandatory subject is an example of an issue
that matters.
58 For a related discussion of the importance of permitting such a voice as part of a
democratic society, see JuDrrH N. SHKLAR, Tim FACES OF INJUSTICE (1990).
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impoverishes the bargaining potential of the parties.5 9
It is helpful to summarize these observations about bargaining theory and
fairness before proceeding to the final element of analysis. First, some
current statutory provisions regulate the bargaining process so as to preclude
the parties from agreeing to certain outcomes. Second, some attempt to
ensure that disparate, mismatched resources do not figure decisively in the
dispute resolution process-that they are in some important sense
neutralized. Finally, some statutes prohibit the parties from discussing or
resolving certain topics before other matters are settled.
Each such provision (singularly or in combination) operates to constrain
participation and choice. 60 They share the characteristic that each propels
parties to shape bargaining outcomes according to claims of legal justice. 61
While there may be nothing inappropriate about that, it also means that
fairness might have been compromised.
The final consideration is now in order. If the mediation process is
predicated on the bargaining process-i.e., mediation is a procedure for
assisting parties to reach a negotiated outcome-then the nature of the
mediator's role must be appropriately described (or assumed) in relevant
legislation and rules. Once that is crystallized, the impact of the mediator's
role on fairness can then fall into relief.
D. A Theory of Mediation
Statutory provisions embrace competing visions of the form in which the
mediation process operates; given the form, mediator behaviors and duties
follow.
59 See Love & McDonald, supra note 36, at 8-10.
60 One must assume that a participant always has the right to refuse to accept a
proposal-concerns about "pressure to settle" are clearly important and legitimate ones
but speak to a different concern.
61 Clearly much more needs to be analyzed in this regard, but the structure of the
analysis is the following: If a statute requires a certain type of substantive outcome, then
how one reaches that outcome-via a competitive or problem-solving orientation-
becomes constrained. In general, the more limited the potential dialogue and options,
the more competitive the orientation tends to be. The less structured or constrained the
dispute's definition, the more potential exists for adopting a problem-solving
orientation. It is important to note that a problem-solving orientation does not-and
should not-eliminate a party's desire to promote self-interest, be selfish or greedy.
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1. Form
Most persons envision mediation as an interactive process in which
parties, with a mediator's assistance, explore settlement possibilities. A useful
example is contained in California's definition: "'Mediation' means a process
in which a neutral person or persons facilitate communication between the
disputants to assist them in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement." 62 But
some jurisdictions portray it differently, especially in designated contexts:
Florida: Campus Master Plans and Campus Development Agreements.
Disputes that arise in the implementation of an executed campus
development agreement must be resolved as follows: (a) Each party shall
select one mediator and notify the other in writing of the selection; within 15
days after selection, the two party-selected mediators shall select a neutral,
third mediator" (d) Within 60 days after the convening of the panel, the
panel shall issue a report containing a recommended resolution of the issues
in dispute.63
Indiana:
Whenever a dispute arises between the users of surface water in a
watershed area, any party... may request that the natural resource
commission mediate the dispute... Upon receipt of such request, the
commission shall conduct a hearing. The commission is authorized to make
a survey of the water supply in the watershed involved and to endeavor to
add additional sources of water for users in such watershed. Any
recommendation of the commission in any such mediation proceeding shall
not be binding upon the parties 4
Ohio:
The director of mental health ... shall: [r]eview each board's plan
submitted... and approve or disapprove it in whole or in part.. . . If the
approval of a plan remains in dispute thirty days prior to the conclusion of
the fiscal year ... the board or the director may request that the dispute be
submitted to a mutually agreed upon third-party mediator. The mediator
shall issue to the board and the department recommendations for resolution
of the dispute.65
62 CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 1775.1(a)(2) (West 1998).
63 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.155 (17)(a), (d) (West 1994) (emphasis added).
64 IND. CODE § 14-25-1-8 (1997).
65 Omo REv. CODE. ANN. § 5119.61 (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
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These latter provisions import into the mediation process an adversarial
hearing procedure that differs sharply in both theory and tactics from the
bargaining process. Unlike the vision of mediation contained in the California
definition, the hearing process prescribed by these latter statutes are more
akin to versions of arbitration than mediation. The theatre of a process in
which the parties select their mediators, present their case to the panel, and
thereafter receive the panel's nonbinding recommendations for disposition of
the matter compels participants to present their case to a decisionmaker for
judgment rather than to engage in an interactive exchange of bargaining
proposals designed to explore settlement options acceptable to all. This
mediation is nothing more than a dress rehearsal for trial. The Indiana
statutory provision went one step further: it licensed the mediator to provide
tangible resources directly or indirectly to the parties in order to resolve the
controversy. While that mandate might be understandable from the
perspective of enabling a government agency to effectively administer and
implement its statutory mandate, it also licensed mediator behavior that most
ethical codes proscribe as singularly inappropriate because it undermines the
notion of the mediator operating as a neutral intervener. 66
Recent attention has focused on, and in some quarters endorsed, the
practice of "evaluative mediation. 67 Such mediation, it is claimed, licenses
the mediator to utilize the following strategies to get the parties to settle their
case: "Predict impact ... of not settling; develop and offer ... [settlement]
proposals; and urge the parties to accept the mediator's proposal." 68 Finally,
"[i]f the mediator has clout [the ability to bring pressure to bear on one or
more of the parties], she might ... threaten to use it."69 The clothes might
66 Tangibly, there is no need for an intervener to be impartial if he has access to
resources that could resolve a dispute (e.g., if a person "assisting" an injured party and
an insurance company bargain over compensation for injuries and the plaintiff's offer
exceeded the defendant's offer by $50,000, there certainly is nothing wrong with an
intervener proffering the $50,000 difference from his or her own pocket to settle the
matter). Most practitioners not only do not have the resources to facilitate settlements in
such a matter but view it as a violation of their ethical code of conduct to operate in
such a fashion.
67 See James J. Alfini, Evaluative Versus Facilitative Mediation: A Discussion, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. RV. 919 (1997); Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators'
Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARv.
NEGOTIATION L. REV. 7 (1996); Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative
Mediator Orientations: Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. Rv. 985 (1997).
68 SHKLAR, supra note 58, at 31.
69 Id.
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have changed but the reality is that the person performing as an evaluative
mediator has significantly transformed the process from that of assisted
negotiations to a procedure that bears a striking resemblance to an
adjudicatory framework. That shift significantly constrains how parties can or
cannot bargain. From the perspective of fairness, it vitiates its central
substantive dimension: fair procedures assume (1) starting points in which
parties possess the autonomy to explore settlement arrangements, (2) the
liberty to strike deals which maximize their freedom of operation consistent
with a like liberty for all and (3) outcomes that do not put one party in a
notably worse-off situation than his original starting position. Evaluative
mediators are not constrained by any of those features. Even if, accidentally
or intentionally, evaluator mediators steered, cajoled or directed parties to
agree to settlement terms that were consistent with the requirements of (2)
and (3), such an approach systematically violates (1). Similarly, the
evaluative orientation, charitably speaking, provides only minimal respect to
procedural fairness concerns.
Thus, to secure a vision of the mediation process that is consistent with
fairness principles, a uniform statute must embrace an approach similar to
that reflected in the California provision, whereby persons treat with integrity
the concepts of facilitating communication and assisting disputants to reach a
mutually acceptable agreement. If that is done, then certain types of mediator
obligations follow.
2. Mediator Duties
Two statutory provisions regarding mediator duties illustrate process
elements that raise policy and fairness concerns:
1. "A mediator shall assist the parties in reaching an informed
and voluntary agreement." 70
2. "A mediator shall... ensure that the parties consider fully
the best interests of the children .... "71
While the motivation for these provisions is understandable, it is
misplaced. The Florida provision tries to ensure that parties do not reach
agreements ignorant of their legal rights while the Kansas provision wants to
make certain that the interests of some primary stakeholders are not
70 FLA. R. 10.060 (1995) (emphasis added).
71 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-603 (1996) (emphasis added).
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inadvertently or deliberately neglected by the named parties to the
controversy who possess exclusive authority to establish settlement terms.
Neither statutory provision, however, can survive considerations of fairness
principles. Consider the Kansas provision first.
To support an interpretation that the law requires a certain substantive
outcome, one must interpret the Kansas provision as requiring the mediator to
ensure that the best interests of the child take priority among the settlement
terms. That strong interpretation does not seem warranted, for the statutory
language appears to mandate only that the mediator make the parties consider
information pertinent to that standard. The weak interpretation, conversely,
seems to require only that the parties consider, or take note of, the best
interests of the children when developing their settlement terms, even if the
terms of the final negotiated agreement systemically vitiate that standard. But
this interpretation appears implausible in light of the goals the statute is
attempting to promote. The most coherent interpretation and application of
the statutory provision, then, appears to be the following: the mediator must
compel the parties not only to consider fully the best interests of the child but
to somehow incorporate those interests into tangible settlement terms in a way
that does not place them at the lowest priority level. If that is the mediator's
duty, though, then the mediator confronts the same difficulty, on fairness
considerations, that attended those statutory provisions that require particular
bargaining outcomes: namely it only ensures consideration of legal justice
outcomes, not necessarily fair outcomes. But there is a more important,
instructive lesson to glean from another aspect of this provision.
The mediator has a duty to ensure that the parties consider fully the best
interests of the children. How would one assess whether the mediator
complied with this requirement? A court reviewing the parties' proposed
settlement terms might believe that the arrangements, prima facie, ignored
the children's best interests and compel the parties and their advocates to
explain and justify the proposed settlement. Alternatively, one party might try
to contest court approval of the agreement by claiming that at no time did the
parties consider (or the mediator make them do so) matters relevant to the
mediator's statutory duty. More seriously, how would one demonstrate that
the mediator had the parties consider fully the children's best interests? Does
fully mean every possible option? How do resource constraints affect the
capacity of the parties to comply with this mandate? If the settlement terms
were prima facie plausible, what could the reviewing judge demand in the
way of information to make certain that full consideration had been given to
possible options?
The sentiment driving this provision is the notion of informed
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decisionmaking. The goal is to make certain that participants do not
prematurely foreclose possibilities and options or, in this instance, weigh
more heavily their own interests against those of others who will be directly
affected by their decision. No one wants to applaud or endorse autonomy
when it is exercised in the throes of ignorance. But if a fully considered
decision can be confirmed only by the presence or absence of certain types of
settlement terms in the final arrangement, then not only are the statutory
framers reintroducing required substantive settlement terms into the
bargaining and mediation process but also they are positing a mediator duty
that is conceptually impossible to fulfill and embraces a vision of mediation
that is at odds with fairness principles. The Florida statutory provision raises
these latter dangers directly.
The Florida provision must be interpreted as requiring the mediator to
block any agreement that is not informed. How the mediator is to do this is
left open, so a mediator could: (1) if consistent with other provisions of the
ethical code, provide relevant information to one or both parties and then let
them decide whether or not to settle the matter; or (2) terminate the mediation
session with the admonition to parties to investigate the proposed
arrangements with other individuals (e.g., counsel) in order to make certain
that the proposed provisions are what they wish to embrace. 72 The concern
about informed settlement is routinely cited in the context of whether a party
is aware of his legal rights. Presumably under the Florida provision, all that
informed means is that the party is aware of how his legal rights might
inform or be affected by the proposed settlement terms. The concern and
passion for a party's well-being that animates the demand for informed
settlement noticeably does not extend to requiring the mediator to ensure the
parties' informed assessment of the proposed settlement terms on their
economic, psychological, metaphysical, ethical or political rights or
interests. 73 Given the context of how the claims originate and cases ultimately
72 For a thoughtful discussion of the challenges ingredient to mediator tactics in
making certain that parties are informed of their legal rights, see Joel Kurtzberg &
Jamie Henikoff, Freeing the Parties from the Law: Designing an Interest and Rights
Focused Model of Landlord/Tenant Mediation, 1997 J. DIsp. REsOL. 53, 92-115.
73 In the same way in which a mediator might terminate the hearing to encourage
parties to consult with legal counsel, they do not terminate the hearing to make certain
that the parties consult with their financial investment advisor, religious counselor or
other mentors or resources to whom individuals frequently turn for advice. There is a
natural and appropriate concern that if lawyers or mediators were to explore these types
of matters, they would be moving into areas of knowledge for which they do not possess
particular expertise. Further, they would be expanding the range of discussion topics
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find their way to mediation, that is understandable. But the question is
whether fairness is secured by insisting that the mediator has a duty to ensure
informed decisions. The answer is straightforward: of course not. All this
"informed" requirement accomplishes is to reintroduce, via a mediator's
duty, the requirement that one considers one's legal rights before agreeing to
any outcome. But this simply posits the concept of fairness as being legal
fairness; the right, for instance, to be treated with dignity and respect that
was posited as a component of fairness might be trumped by the mere
assertion of one's legal right.74
But something in this analysis seems to have gone askew. Surely, the
sentiment for wanting decisions to be informed is laudable; it is not a
desirable state of affairs for decisions, whatever their context, to be made in
ignorance. Similarly, mediation proponents do not want to be labeled as
advocating a "know-nothing" approach to bargaining and decisionmaking.
Why, then, should statutory efforts to ensure intelligent decisionmaking in the
mediation process be subject to attack? What has malfunctioned?
beyond any type of defined or focused agenda. All that might be accurate; it fails,
however, to answer the question of why a mediator should restrict her concern about
ensuring informed agreement only to an awareness of a party's legal rights, unless one
simply presumes without argument that for a lawsuit to be mediated, the only rights or
interests relevant to the discussion are legal ones. The weakness of that response is that
it simply presumes without argument a vision of mediation as being appropriately
dominated by, if not exclusively focused on, an analysis and consideration of legal
issues. It further presumes that in every lawsuit, each party and her lawyer always
comprehensively identify all relevant legal theories of actions and appropriate theories
of relief and that a mediator must ensure that that is obtained. Even this requirement,
though, might compel parties to investigate their claims and that might exceed their
resource capacity, need or interest.
74 1 am not suggesting that one should prohibit a person from filing a legal claim.
The sentiment designed to be captured here is a sensitivity to how the simple assertion
of a legal claim might itself violate fairness considerations. Therefore, if a mediator
must make people aware of or assert their legal rights, then he or she might not be
promoting fairness in so doing. Assume a situation in which one party with remarkably
vast resources files a legal claim for rent arrears and repossession of an apartment to
which she is entitled. The mere assertion of the claim demolishes the fragile spirit and
self-esteem of the frail, destitute, elderly, widowed tenant as well as dramatically
intensifies her psychological stress for fear of losing all of her life's possessions in order
to pay off the debt arrears. The sentiment noted here simply is that, in an important
moral sense, it could be argued that the landlord's asserting the claim is a thoughtless,
mean and in an important sense, unfair thing for that person to do. The conventional cry
would be: "You just shouldn't do it." Clearly, though, the landlord is within her legal
rights to do so.
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The problem develops because those wanting to ensure informed consent
typically use as their examples those situations in which the less powerful
party appears to be willing to agree to an outcome that public policy, through
its statutes, has deemed improper.75 Although any individual might agree to
work for wages at less than the minimum wage scale, why laud that as an
exercise of autonomy when the policy decision has been made that persons
engaged in business and employ others must compensate those persons at a
prescribed minimum rate? The appeal of the example76 flows from the fact
that legislators or jurists have developed specific responses to redress those
inequities. To thereafter embrace a bargaining or mediation process that does
not compel parties to abide by, or at least consider, those legal entitlements
and duties appears to simply reward some parties-the most powerful
ones-to evade the very laws that were developed in response to their
belligerent or selfish behavior.77 But such examples and cries provide only
part of the actual story. A simple hypothetical illustrates another.
Presume Jones and Day meet one another on the street; Day verbally
abuses Jones and physically assaults him. Jones is shaken but not physically
harmed; nevertheless, wanting protection against future attacks, he files a
criminal complaint against Day. The case, as often happens, is referred to
mediation. During the course of the mediation conference, the mediator
learns that Day was a former employee of Jones. Jones had fired him and
Day had been without steady employment since that date. As the discussion
developed, Day shared information with Jones that made out a basic claim for
a termination in violation of both federal and state antidiscrimination laws.
Jones, learning of these allegations for the first time and becoming visibly
uncomfortable at the possibility of litigation on these matters, initiates
conversation with Day about his returning to work for Jones. After three
hours of discussion in mediation, the parties are discussing the following
elements of a settlement: entry into a company job training program which,
upon successful completion, would result in Day's being assigned to a
different department from the one in which he was last employed and at a
higher pay grade; payment of a stipulated sum to cover lost wages and
75 See SHLAR, supra note 58, at 55-57.
76 A host of other examples can quickly be constructed involving the same
analytical structure: parties with severely disproportionate resources bargaining over
matters that had been presumptively altered via legislation and resulting in the parties
reaching settlement terms that reflect precisely the condition that the statutory provision
was designed to deter.
77 This is the basic argument of Owen Fiss in his widely cited article Against
Settlement. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
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benefits; and a plan for announcing this settlement to the public and company
personnel that is designed to save face for both Jones and Day. 78
Before the parties reach closure on these terms, the mediator asks to meet
again with each party in caucus. When talking privately, Jones makes it very
clear to the mediator that the compelling motivation for his pursuing these
discussions and entertaining this settlement proposal was his fear of potential
adverse publicity, cost and, ultimately, liability in an antidiscrimination
lawsuit. The mediator, with the prospect of the agreement looming before the
parties, suddenly realizes that the statute of limitations for Day's claim against
Jones has expired; Jones is completely protected- his concerns about being
vulnerable in a discrimination lawsuit filed by Day are misplaced, for Day
cannot legally prevail. If this case operated under Florida law, must the
mediator inform Jones of that fact so that Jones can make an informed
decision? If the proposed settlement might not be informed, arguably it
should be stopped. Indeed, those who promote or endorse evaluative
mediation should triumphantly note that the mediator would (or should) have
raised the statute of limitation matter at the outset, thereby quickly short
circuiting the hypothetical discussion from the outset.
Further, neither the Florida provision nor those like it distinguish
between the situation in which parties are represented by counsel from those
in which they appear pro se. In the above hypothetical, the mediator's duty
should remain the same: if the mediator believes the party might be making a
decision that is not informed, even if the party's legal representative has not
brought this matter to his client's attention, the mediator should torpedo the
discussion.
What this hypothetical exposes is that it is clearly possible that the party
to the mediation session who is operating without full knowledge of his legal
rights is also the person who enjoys decided advantages on every other
dimension of their relationship: he is more powerful, resourceful, selfish and
brutal. If the mediator is under a duty to ensure informed party
decisionmaking, then the mediator's disclosure operates not to equalize a
power relationship but to solidify the inequities. Such disclosure undermines
fairness; it does so as well in the critics' examples.
The motivation to require informed decisionmaking in the more typical,
distressing examples is to ensure that the social decisions captured in legal
policy are enforced. Obviously, there is much to commend that and certainly
nothing untoward about it. But to require that mediators ensure, rather than
encourage or promote, informed decisionmaking is to improperly play upon
78 The charges of assault and battery have long since given way to this more
substantive discussion, as is typically the case in such mediation referrals.
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the ambiguous concept of being informed. Epistemologically, advocates are
improperly equating being informed with the notion of full information about
legal rights and consequences. Simply stated, there are degrees of being
informed. One can be more or less informed and still make reasonable
judgments. Parents routinely-and daily-make parenting decisions that are
variously informed by one's individual knowledge of the psychology of child
development, group behavior and gender and racial differences among
children; understandings about biological and physiological needs of children;
convictions about moral and religious values, political principles; and by
habits of one's own developed in childhood and over a lifetime. Are those
decisions informed? The best one can venture to say is that some of those
decisions are more informed and thoughtful than others. But, absent crossing
a minimal threshold (such as parenting practices that endanger the physical
well-being of the child), there is a broad latitude for persons to make
decisions affecting one's own interests as well as others that are reasonable
and rational. Further, advising or telling someone that they cannot settle
because they are operating without sufficient information is a form of
paternalism that is not only objectionable in theory but also impractical, for
there is no conceptual principle that can terminate the search for additional
data to make certain the decision is informed.
So, for the hypothetical involving Jones and Day, most proponents
believe that mediation's breathtaking promise emerges precisely in situations
such as that described above: parties have considered their interests,
brainstormed both settlement and non-settlement options, evaluated and
prioritized the competing claims and then exercised their freedom to strike a
deal on terms they believe meet their considered interests. There was no
coercion. No one was compelled to adopt particular settlement proposals.
Their decisions were respectfully informed by a variety of considerations. All
that one can say is that their decision was not fully or as fully informed as it
might have been. But that can be said of any decision that we make.
Bargaining and mediation accept that as a given and place weight and respect
on the parties' capacity to articulate and advance their own interests. From a
fairness perspective, neither party is worse off from their original positions.
Having posited this argument, there is reason to consider attempting to
meet this concern about ensuring informed decision-making in a more
concrete manner. The reality is that the expanded use of mediation is
occurring in court-annexed contexts; it is both expected and valuable to have
the dispute resolution process operate in a manner that is consistent with its
defining democratic values and systematically weaves legal information into
the decisionmaking process. The most straightforward resolution to such a
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concern, though its practicality is suspect, is to require that each party to a
mediation conference be represented by counsel. Assuming we operate with a
more modest conception of informed decisionmaking that acknowledges that
a person can make informed decisions with only some information, even if
not all relevant information, then having parties represented by counsel
creates the presumption that each person has access to a capable resource
who can provide him with appropriate information. We avoid the dilemma of
unequal quality of representation in the same manner that the traditional
system does not feel plagued by it, namely by acknowledging that counsel
can provide some, even if not complete, information.
While the practicality of implementing such a proposal must remain
suspect, given that sustained efforts to provide legal representation to indigent
citizens or others in need has not been successful, it is important to note two
of its features: first, many parties in colirt-annexed or mandated civil
mediation conferences are represented by counsel, so the statutory
requirement for mediators to ensure informed choice is unnecessary and
destructive. Second, it directly responds to and satisfies the fairness concern
of all.
Oddly enough, though, some mediation statutes do not authorize or
permit parties to be represented. Consider the following:
1. "Unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties, the
parties' legal counsel shall not be present at any scheduled mediation
sessions." 79
2. "The mediator has authority to exclude counsel from
participation in the mediation proceedings .... "80
The operative presumption of these provisions is that the presence of
legal counsel is inconsistent with a conversational forum that is to be informal
or nonadversarial. That presumption assumes a vision of lawyering that is at
odds with much practice and theory. From the perspective of ensuring
fairness, it is unwarranted because it presumes that a lawyer's distinctive role
is to restrict conversation to legal arguments and to focus all efforts
exclusively on either seeking full vindication of a client's legal rights or
minimizing the need for her to comply with her legal duties.81If that vision of
79 OR. REv. STAT. § 36.195(1) (1996).
80 CAL. FAM. CODE § 3182 (West 1998).
81 For a related discussion of the role of lawyers in mediation, and their impact on
the process, see generally Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging
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lawyering were accurate, then no lawsuit, with or without the assistance of a
mediator, would settle. But the reality is the contrary, and a thoughtful
mediation process should embrace it.
III. CONCLUSION: PROPOSED STATUTORY PROVISIONS TO ENSURE
FAIRNESS
If the discussion above is persuasive, then a uniform mediation statute
must feature the following principles to ensure that fairness principles among
individuals are respected:
The Purpose Clause must promote a conception of negotiation
and mediation that is consistent with the most robust possible
conception of party choice and autonomy. It must feature and give
support to a democratic decisionmaking process in which the role of
the respective parties, representatives and interveners is delineated
and structured to support it. Unlike some statutory provisions
referenced above, a uniform statute should not incorporate any
provision that is targeted to achieve particular substantive goals.
Consistent with establishing threshold conditions for the exercise
of autonomy, the uniform statute could and should compel initial
participation in mediation by appropriate stakeholders. In similar
ways, the statute should target those matters that constitute threshold
requirements for party engagement and the possibility of a
constructive conversation.
To ensure substantive fairness, the statute cannot skew the
bargaining process by restricting the issues parties are eligible to
consider or by mandating their discussion sequence. The statute
cannot require, in order to confirm good-faith participation, that
parties must adjust their proposals in bargaining or mediation or
forego other avenues to adjust concerns or advance their interests. To
support these provisions, the statutory definition of mediation must
rule out as possible any form of what has been referred to as
evaluative mediation.
the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L.
REV. 1317 (1995).
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The statute must display or assume that a mediator's duties focus
on acting, and cultivating, party behaviors that ensure procedural
fairness. To achieve that, the statute must define mediation so as to
establish a conversational procedure in which fundamental elements
of conversational dignity and respect are secured; to ensure that
inequalities in advocacy skills, verbal and non-verbal party
behaviors, and mediator biases have no room to flourish, the statute
must not characterize the mediation process as informal or non-
adversarial; and to ensure minimum levels of informed
decisionmaking, the statute should minimally provide parties with a
non-waivable right to counsel.
Mediation performed pursuant to such provisions should and would
constitute a critical resource in the life of a free people.

